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Abstract 
Ports are complex operations involving government and 
private-sector partners in creating economic benefits and in identifying, 
managing and absorbing economic, environmental and security risks. 
Allocation and assessment of risks is necessitated and facilitated by the 
diversity of organisations involved. Allocation of the cost of risks among 
the partners or its transfer to outside agencies through insurance or financing 
arrangements is essential. However, this allocation is not purely a function 
of attributes of the risks themselves and their controllability by each of the 
partners but depends in part on factors such as power structures within 
partnerships and capacity to absorb risks. 
PFI and Port Authorities: Risk identification, Risk allocation and Risk 
sustainability 
 
1. Introduction    
Ports are complex combinations of interlocking elements including natural features, 
infrastructure and superstructure linked through transport connections to other ports and 
to distribution centres in the hinterland (Juhel 2001).  The management of natural 
resources, infrastructure and superstructure may all be in different hands (de Langen 
2004, de Langen and Visser 2005), as well as serving independent logistics businesses 
who use port facilities (Compés López and Poole 1998). 
The participation of public sector authorities is normally necessary, because of the need 
for environmental protection in the development of natural harbours and subsequent 
operations and the need for security at national boundaries.  Besides, infrastructure is 
more easily managed in the public sector when extensive planning powers are needed. 
However, cargo-handling operations and inland transportation links, as well as the 
shipfping companies who use them and the clients of those companies, are in the main 
carried out by commercial private-sector companies.  Buildings, plant and equipment and 
services tend also to be more efficiently provided by private commercial organizations. 
Some other services, such as customs and public security are, once again, natural 
functions of the state, because of the lack of sufficient incentives for private sector 
organizations to take action in the wider public interest.  At maritime ports, effectively 
located at national boundaries, a range of public security services are needed, placing 
limits on private sector services.  Security services may include control of imports of 
pharmaceuticals, harmful or hazardous substances and alien species, the need for 
quarantine arrangements for live plants and animals, prevention of illegal arms shipments 
or shipments of dangerous goods and controls over the movement of individuals involved 
in organized crime or terrorism or simply illegal immigration. 
Because ports are complex operations, which involve interactions between national and 
international markets, private and governmental operations and the natural and built 
environment, they are exposed to a very wide range of risks. In addition, because the 
ownership of different elements of port facilities and of the businesses that use those 
facilities are all in different hands and because of the impact of events at ports on the 
external world, a wide range of parties is affected by those risks and the risk may not be 
directly controllable by those most affected by it.  Port-related risks are numerous and 
include cargo theft (Conley 2000), risks from organized crime and terrorism (Atkinson 
2002, p.16) and operational risks such as that suffered by the UK Milford Haven port 
authority during the Sea Empress incident in 1996 (Navare, 2002) and manpower risks 
(Saundry and Turnbull, 1999) . The growing business aspect for ports are new 
partnership arrangements which result in the transference or allocation of risk to 
partnership parties. 
These port and partnership risks provide indications to how risks in broad terms might be 
identified: risks from operations or sharing of operations; risks from full or partial 
governmental intervention, social and political risks; partnership and co-active 
collaboration risks. The literature on port and partnership risks, however, is not strong in 
portraying empirical reality and demonstrating the reality of what constitutes risks to 
ports.  
In the next part we consider the literature on port and partnership risks and attempt to 
disassociate practical reality of risks from empirical reality to establish key risk 
categories that affect ports and their partnership arrangements. It is only when this can be 
achieved then we can begin to evaluate risk allocation and risk sustainability issues for 
ports and their partnership arrangements.  
 
2. Studies in port and partnership risk 
2.1 The theory of port and partnership risk identification 
The studies on port risks have been predominantly based on the practical reality of 
operations more than by way of empirical explanations. In initially considering the theory 
of port risks, there is a need to articulate two fundamental questions: first, how have the 
risks been identified? What have both practitioners and researchers sought to stipulate 
port risks. This thinking is extended to considering risks arising in partnership 
arrangements entered in by port authorities. 
Second, to what extent are empirical explanations different and substantive over those 
offered as practical solutions?  
 
2.1.1.Risk Identification and categorization of port and partnership risks 
 
Risks in port management can be categorized in a number of ways: 
 
1. By cause, for example, potential human action or potential natural disaster 
2. By location of control, i.e. whether the risk can be controlled within the organization 
concerned or outside the organization or whether it is uncontrollable. This largely 
depends on the scope of the organization itself and the scope of other organizations.  
In some cases it may appear natural that a risk-bearing function is carried out outside 
a commercial organization but the organization may nevertheless take on this task.  
For example, the need for public security at national boundaries generally necessitates 
the presence of governmental security forces, although even this can be partly 
delegated to private warehouses operating under licensing and supervision by 
customs authorities (Chalfin 2007).  On the other hand, apparently integral functions 
such as signalling and Information Technology management and training can be 
outsourced and the management of risk transferred to outside contractors (de Langen 
and Visser (2005). 
3. By people affected, owners, employees, customers or others. Again, this may partly 
depend on organizational and contract structure.  For example, risks attaching to 
property values and property management costs must be borne somewhere but the 
location of the risk depends essentially on the ownership of the property and the 
nature and length of leasing and PFI contracts.  Jacobs (2003) discusses the issue of 
leasing publicly owned port land and buildings to private sector firms and the use of 
public scrutiny of tenders for leases of public property in use in the Port of Los 
Angeles.  This can give rise to opportunity costs for the public sector partner, while 
transferring both risks and opportunities to the private sector, who must bear the risk 
that the income from the facility does not cover the lease cost while retaining any 
additional profits made if the lease is underpriced.  The degree to which bids are 
competitive and the length of the lease may be affected by public policy, as it may be 
difficult to attract bids for shorter term leases if favourable terms are not likely to be 
offered for a continuation of the contract. 
4. By nature of effect, physical injury or loss of welfare. Risks of physical injury to 
employees and customers are qualitatively different to risks of financial loss, whether 
to customers, employees or owners and also from loss of amenity resulting from 
damage to the natural or built environment, even though financial or environmental 
damage may entail health risks as a further consequence. 
5. By location of the effects. Risks relating to harbours may have an effect offshore or 
inland and these effects may be either on or off the property of the organization with 
ownership rights in the harbour. 
6. By frequency. Risk entails uncertainty, with the level of uncertainty being in part 
measured by the probability of a particular event occurring on each occasion. 
Statistically, the frequency of abnormal events with quantifiable effects is measured 
by kurtosis, with low kurtosis scores (flat distribution) indicating that extreme 
outcomes are frequent. 
7. By degree of effects. Generally, the frequency and the degree of effects must be 
considered together, as the same type of event with different degrees of effects may 
occur with different frequencies.  For example, a strike involving a single department 
at a single contractor may occur more frequently than a general strike affecting all 
port-related industries.  The degree of effects may be statistically measured by the use 
of standard deviations from the mean.Terrorist attacks are a good example of events 
whose seriousness is in large part a consequence of the size of their potential effects.  
Although the incidence of attacks is capable of being modelled (Enders and Sandler 
2002, Tavares 2004, Enders and Sandler 2006) and has also, overall, been in decline 
worldwide since the early 1990s (Enders and Sandler 2002, Sandler and Enders 2004), 
the scale of the largest individual attacks has been increasing and the type and scale 
of attacks differ widely from year to year (Tilly 2004, Tavares 2004) and between 
terrorist organizations (Tilly 2004, Barros and Proença 2005). 
8. By degree of symmetry, i.e. whether there is upside variability or only a downside 
and whether the upside is commensurate with the downside. Risks may be considered 
to be symmetrical when any degree of favourable variation has the same probability 
as the same degree of adverse variation.  This is the case when a) the risk is cause by 
a variable with a normal distribution pattern and b) the benefits of a unit variation in 
one direction from the mean expected value are commensurate with the harm caused 
by a unit variation in the other direction. This may be true, for example, of fuel costs.  
However, most risk factors are highly skewed, because the best possible outcome, 
usually consisting of the absence of an event, is the most probable.  However, the risk 
of an adverse event may not be negligible. Therefore the median outcome will be 
slightly better than the mean. 
9. By level of predictability. Although predictability can relate to the standard deviations, 
kurtosis and skewness of risk factors and outcomes, it has it also has a great deal to do 
with the possibility of modelling the effects of causal factors or modelling the causal 
factors themselves.  If the causal factors are too numerous or too greatly dependent on 
numerous causal factors, it becomes virtually impossible to build reliable models.  
For example, Williamson (2006) found that the actual progress, establishment and 
environmental impacts of alien species could be explained in retrospect but could not 
be predicted with any degree of accuracy. Fowler, T.G., and Sørgård, E. (2000) have 
also shown that it is possible to model the levels of some types of shipping accidents 
in general, although this does not mean that individual businesses will be able to 
model the distribution of losses accurately and modelling of some categories of 
accident, including groundings, proved harder to model.  The control of piracy may 
also be heavily influenced by local political factors, including corruption and 
involvement of state officials (Vagg 1995), making medium-term prediction difficult. 
 
Risk identification, allocation and management are vital issues in all projects involving 
the public sector (Gao and Handley-Schachler 2001), with partnership projects presenting 
counterparty risks as well as additional opportunities to transfer risks to other partners. 
These risk categories, however, are considered in absolute terms rather than in relative 
terms. These risk categorizations intimate objective- level identification of the nature of 
the risk which can mask the true nature of risk identified. The sorting criteria of risk 
below unmasks the key attributes and nature of risks in ports management and 
partnership arrangements.  
2.1.2. Identifying Port risks: practical versus empirical risk factors 
The focus of practitioner observations has been on the extent on visible issues such as: 
security, environment, operations, management. For example, Bragdon (2007) 
demonstrated the practical implication of a failed risk identification process. He 
suggested the need to consider the process and responsibility for risk identification but 
although the process implications are important the key question on what is the key risks 
make-up in project management is not considered.  
In addition, ports and their related businesses are affected by the usual range of 
commercial risks relating to supplier capacity and customer demand.  Rapid growth in 
developing countries can make these factors especially unpredictable for organizations 
generally and for participants in PPPs in particular (Handley-Schachler and Gao 2003). 
 
TABLE AI: IDENTIFICATION OF KEY AREAS OF PORT RISKS     
Studies Risk Practical Studies Empirical Studies 
BY CAUSE 
 Spielmann (2007) 
 Spayd (2006) 
Security  Journal of Commerce   
 Journal of Commerce  
 
 Stanaway, Zalucki, 
Gillespie, 
Rodriguez, Maynard 
(2001)   
Environmental  
 
 
 
 Australian Journal 
of Entomology 
 
 Risk Management 
 McEwan (1994) 
 Christen, (1999; 
2004);  
 
 Nunes and van den 
Bergh (2004), 
 Perakis and Yang 
(2004),  
 Machalaba (2005), 
 Roberts et al. 
(2005); 
 Batabyal and Beladi 
(2006); 
 Stanaway et 
al(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Wall Street Journal 
 Financial Times 
 
 Environmental 
Science and 
technology 
 Environmental and 
Resource 
Economics 
 Marine Economics 
and Logistics 
 
 
 European Journal of 
Operational Research 
 Australian Journal of 
Entomology 
BY LOCATION OF CONTROL 
 Wang et al (2004) Operational   Risk Analysis 
 Spence (2005) Commercial  Canadian Underwriter  
 Bragdon (2007) 
 Mcleod (2001) 
 
 
Management(inc: 
project and process 
management) 
 Defense & AT-L 
 Business Insurance 
 
BY NATURE OF EFFECTS 
 Kaplan and 
Garrick(1981) 
 Turnbull & Wass, 
1995 
Financial    
 
 Risk Analysis 
 
 Public 
Administration 
BY PEOPLE AFFFECTED 
 Turnbull (2006) Stakeholder    British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 
 Larcerda et al 
1996 
 Ruquet (2006) 
Health   American Journal of 
Public Health 
 National Underwriter 
/ Property & Casualty 
Risk & Benefits 
Management 
BY FREQUENCY 
Ronza(2003); 
Wheeler (1993) 
Oil tanker 
movements; small 
boats; loading and 
unloading oil, ferry 
services; cargo 
operations; human 
error issues; 
accidents; 
  Journal of loss 
prevention in the 
process industries 
 Risk analysis 
BY DEGREE OF SYMMETRY 
 Anti-cyclical 
business model 
Little practical reality Little empirical reality 
BY LEVEL OF PREDICTABILITY 
US Government 
Accounting Office 
(GAO) (2005)   
Woods J (1999) 
Risk 
determination 
Most port organizations 
undertake some level of 
risk determination 
based on predictability 
of risk  
There is empirical 
evidence on financial 
risk predictability and 
marine security risk     
Generally, managers of risk in any context are concerned with a number of issues: risk 
identification; risk and uncertainty forecasting; risk management; risk impacts, risk 
allocation and compliance.    
Risk identification is part of risk assessment where questions such as what can go wrong; 
impact outcomes of any risk and what is the potential for impact (Kaplan and Garrick 
1981)? The problem with port risks is that what can go wrong is not limited purely to 
organizational issues such as managerial, operational and security. Furthermore, most of 
these risks are insurable and therefore are quantifiable and cannot be constituted as the 
real risk to ports. 
2.1.3. Importance of Partnership Arrangements 
The scale and diversity of capital projects involved in the development of major ports 
also gives leads to a need for industrial partnership arrangements between different 
bodies (de Langen 2004) to provide sufficient funds, to furnish the required range of 
expertise and to co-ordinate the provision of all essential infrastructure, while at the same 
time guaranteeing sufficient uptake of capacity to make effective use of the infrastructure 
investment. 
Because of the need to co-ordinate different aspects of structural investment and to 
provide incentives to assess the level of provision needed at different port locations, 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), which may take a variety of forms, involving the 
creation of public sector infrastructure and basic services to support private-sector service 
provision, may be a useful mechanism in port development (de Langen 2004, pp.178-
183).  PPPs can allow for the combination of skills from public and private sector 
partners to provide expertise in a wider variety of functions.  They can also enable the 
creation of a clear client-contractor split, for contract monitoring and control purposes.  
PPPs can be used as a vehicle to allow Foreign Direct Investment in port infrastructure, 
especially where suppliers of domestic capital are not willing to commit sufficient 
financial resources to enable plans to be carried out (Comtois and Dong 2007).  Finally, 
they can, in certain circumstances, be used to improve risk allocation, by seeking to 
allocate the cost of some risks to the party responsible for causing the risk or best able to 
manage it.  One form of PPP is the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which can take a 
variety of forms but involves the provision of assets and services by a private sector 
partner who is also responsible for financing the assets or services for direct or indirect 
use in service provision by a public sector partner. 
Private sector involvement in the provision of port information systems (Razzaque 1996, 
p.32, Bagchi and Paik 2001,) and port infrastructure (Wiegmans et al. 2002, Grimsey and 
Lewis 2005, pp.348-350), through public-private partnerships has been common in recent 
years, although the financing of infrastructure has ultimately been by the public sector, 
using taxpayers’ money (Wiegmans et al. 2002).  The task of the private sector partner 
has been to provide infrastructure cheaper than the public sector (Grimsey and Lewis 
2005), with a strong assumption that it is not possible to make a commercial profit from 
infrastructure activities (Wiegmans et al. 2002). 
Some services, such as customs and public security are natural functions of the state, 
because of the lack of sufficient incentives for private sector organizations to take action 
in the wider public interest.  At maritime ports, effectively located at national boundaries, 
a range of public security services are needed which will place limits on the freedoms of 
private sector organizations and employees. Reasons for providing these security services 
include the need to control imports of pharmaceuticals, harmful or hazardous substances 
and alien species, the need for quarantine arrangements for live plants and animals, 
prevention of illegal arms shipments or shipments of dangerous goods and controls over 
the movement of individuals involved in organized crime or terrorism.  In addition, 
controls on the movement of people are maintained to enforce state policies on 
immigration.  Because those potentially affected by security breaches are remote from the 
port area and because it may not be in the commercial interests of private companies to 
refuse transport, maintenance of security and enforcement of government policy are best 
carried out by the public sector. 
2.1.2.1.Risks in partnership arrangements: practical versus empirical risk factors 
The level of risks involved in PFI contracts and the amount of finance required can be a 
barrier to entry for smaller private companies (Ezulike et al. 1997).  Owen and Merna 
(1997) also found that risk allocations early on were perceived to be unfair to private 
sector partners.  Bing et al. (2005) found that the majority of respondents to their survey 
on risk allocation in PFI projects were in favour of most risks being accepted by the 
private sector partner, with the only real exceptions being risks of government actions 
directly relating to the project itself.  Even risks arising from industrial regulations were 
felt to be the responsibility of the private sector partner, as they would be in exclusively 
private sector projects, even though this risk is not controllable for the private sector and 
is, strictly speaking, controllable by the public sector at the highest level.  However, 
allocations of risk do not always succeed in transferring all risks from the public sector 
partner, especially where the essentially non-financial risk of failing to deliver a public 
service are undiminished by the creation of equivalent risks and incentives for the public 
sector partner (Shaoul 2000; McCabe et al. 2001). 
 
Attempts have been made to draw up a complete scheme of risks to be allocated in Public 
Private Partnerships by the Private Finance Panel (1995), Gallimore et al. (1997), 
Akintoye et al. (1998), HM Treasury (2003b), Hodge (2004).  These risks include the 
following general categories: 
Risks that arise out of relationships such as organization with organization and 
organization with stakeholders are difficult to quantify and therefore are difficult to 
identify. Empirical studies do not effectively account for these risks. We have tried in 
Table B to sort a rationale for port risk identification 
Some financial risks may ultimately be borne by private sector financial institutions 
involved in funding the project (Asenova and Beck 2003).  The public sector partner also 
tends to accept a higher known cost in return for a reduction in public sector financial risk 
(Broadbent and Loughlin 2005, p.92; HM Treasury 2003a, p.81; HM Treasury 2003b, 
pp.85-88).  However, this is balanced by a reluctance among public sector bodies to take 
on activities with some downside but substantial and asymmetric opportunities for profit 
(Gao and Handley-Schachler 2003). 
Comment [YUN1]: Might wish to 
shorten this sentence 
 The key factor determining the allocation of risk might be expected to be the location of 
control.  However, it may not always be possible to allocate the risk solely on this basis.  
Firstly, some risks are not controllable by any of the parties, because they are caused by 
third-party action.  Secondly, the effects of the risk may not actually be fully transferable 
to the party which is best placed to control them (Shaoul 2000).  Thirdly, the party 
responsible for the risk may not have a sufficient incentive to enter into the partnership 
arrangement if they are not allowed to share their risks. 
In addition, some risks which are controlled by government are only controlled to the 
extent that they are the result of general government and regulatory action which the 
private sector would, in the normal course of events accept as part of their general 
business risk.  These risks may generally be priced into all contracts.  In addition, the 
provision of state subsidies to cover such risks in the case of companies with government 
contracts may place these companies at an unfair advantage in bidding for other contracts, 
as a result of being able to rely on state protection of the profits of their government 
contracts to survive general economic shocks and thus being able to place a lower price 
on the risks involved in their private sector contracts.  This especially applies to tax and 
regulatory risks. 
 
TABLE A II: IDENTIFICATION OF KEY AREAS OF PARTNERSHIP RISKS 
 
Studies Risk Practical 
Studies 
Empirical Studies 
BY CAUSE 
 Regulatory  
 Examples: Enforced changes in 
construction and service, conditions 
of workers’ employment, relations 
with suppliers and customers, 
compulsory insurance, import and 
export of goods and services. 
 Influences: Legal decisions, 
government decisions and decisions 
of international treaty organizations, 
including United Nations, World 
Trade Organization. 
 Journal of 
Commerce   
 Journal of 
Commerce  
 
  Environmental  
1. Examples: Effects of the project on 
the natural environment, effects on 
flora and fauna,  
2. Effects of natural environmental 
events on employees, epidemics, 
damage to land and buildings from 
land erosion or natural disasters. 
3. Influences: Nature of project, 
location and natural environment. 
Inflation rates, service delivery 
timescales, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Australian 
Journal of 
Entomology 
 Risk 
Management 
 Environment
al Science 
and 
technology 
 Environment
al and 
Resource 
   Policy  
 Examples: Continued public sector 
requirement for services, government 
  Risk Analysis 
Comment [j2]: MH – would yo be 
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risk attributes for port and partnership risks 
support for competing initiatives or 
rival regional hubs. 
 Influences: Changes in party of 
government or government 
personnel, pressure group action. 
   Tax  
 Examples: Level of taxation of 
income, profits, payroll payments or 
land use.  
 Influences: Government action. 
 Canadian 
Underwrite
r 
 
BY PEOPLE AFFECTED 
   
 
 
Man-made disasters and other human 
factors 
 Examples: Major accidents, 
explosions, war, civil strife, 
terrorism, organized crime, labour 
disputes, sabotage. 
 Influences: Vulnerability of the 
project to specific risks, political 
climate, quality of intelligence and 
policing. 
 Defense & 
AT-L 
 Business 
Insurance 
 
BY NATURE, DEGREE AND FREQUENCY  OF EFFECTS 
 Kaplan and 
Garrick(1981) 
 Bagchi and Paik 
(2001) 
Financial  
 Examples: Interest rates on 
borrowing, ability to refinance 
projects at a later date, currency 
fluctuations affecting foreign 
currency loans. 
 Influences: Supply and demand for 
loan capital, central bank interest 
rates. 
  
 
 Risk Analysis 
 
 Public 
Administration 
 Inflation  
 Examples: Ability to generate 
positive cashflow after inflation. 
 Influences: inventory levels, 
creditor payment periods, debtor 
turnover periods. 
  
 Turnbull (2006) Demand  
 Examples: Sufficiency of demand to 
cover costs for the private sector or to 
create a benefit commensurate with 
the cost for the public sector. 
 Influences: Demand curve, quality, 
location and suitability of the service 
offered, competition. 
  British Journal 
of Industrial 
Relations 
 Larcerda et al 
(1996) 
 Ruquet (2006) 
Supply-Side  
 Examples: Construction time and 
cost, ongoing cost of service 
provision, service interruptions.  
 Influences: Efficiency of 
construction and service, quality of 
construction, supply and demand 
for labour, supply and demand for 
raw materials, geological factors 
and rescue archaeology affecting 
  American 
Journal of 
Public Health 
 National 
Underwriter / 
Property & 
Casualty Risk 
& Benefits 
Management 
construction. 
DEGREE OF SYMMETRY 
LEVE LOF PREDICTABILITY 
 
 It may also be difficult to establish the cause of losses which may result from a 
combination of risks.  For example, a governmental decision to support competing 
projects may be influenced by service quality issues which may also affect the 
competitiveness of the service offered by the PPP. 
 
2.1.4. Risk Allocation 
 
Risk allocation involves the shift in resources between the participants in a partnership 
and in the public private partnership this means risk is allocated or shared between the 
public and private participants in port management 
 
However in any partnership there is another outside partner and thatis the insurer of psort 
and partnership risk (see Figure 1) 
 
Risk allocation mechanism involves three factors , pricing risk for allocation, retention of 
risk and cost of retention and negotiating the volume and types of risks to be allocated. 
Negotiation involves outside parties such grant providers and insurers. Risk pricing is 
critical as if risk costs of allocation is high this may lead to discontinuing partnership 
arrangements or requiring high risk premium in undertaking the risks. 
 
 
2.1.5. Risk sustainability 
 
The sustainability value is based on effective governance structures and risk, quality, 
performance, culture management structures that demonstrate key benefits to the 
stakeholders and to the partnership over a sustained period of time.  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Sorting criteria 
It is clear from the risks identified that risks faced by ports are numerous and varied. 
Although, not yet established some of the risks have higher impact values than others. 
There is, therefore, a need to categorize the risks and provide some level of justification 
for the categorization into the three areas of risk identification, allocation and 
 
Risk identification 
Risk allocation 
Risk 
sustainability 
Partnership, sharing, 
pricing, retaining, 
negotiating and 
insurance 
Governance, risk quality, 
performance, culture & 
stakeholder management,  
sustainability. Empirical evidence is mixed and vague, however, by sorting this it enables 
the use of this. 
TABLE B: SORTING KEY ATTRIBUTES  
Sorting of risks into key categories 
Risk Identification 
Power relationships 
1. Power- status of  port                                     - (Port Byelaws) – legislative powers conferred on ports  
                                                                                                - Jacobs (2006)-territorial rooted structures of power   
                                                                                                - Jacobs (2006) economic power  
                                                                                                - Hall (2003: 350)- port is a local ‘community of  
                                                                                                   practice’, which constitutes a relatively strong  
                                                                                                  countervailing force against convergent institutional  
                                                                                                   change and for persistent institutional variation –  
2. Power – market                                              -  Rimmer (1998)-  global alliances  
3. Power -status of partners                               - Jacobs 2006- shared power  
4. Power -status of external controllers             -Wang  and Slack -Port authorities dependent on  
                                                                         Government 
- Jacobs 2006 shared power 
- Everett (2003) - Satisfy short term political gains 
5. Power- status of other stakeholders              - Turnbull (2006) - (labour power (structural and 
                                                                                           associational power) 
-  Saundry and Turnbull(1999) 
- Hoyle (2000)– community power 
6. Power – internet                                          -  Turnbull (2006 ) countervailing power 
 
Risk sharing relationships 
1. Risks borne by port                                        - Turnbull and Wass (1995) – risk displacement by  
                                                                         risk  sharing 
-  Price (2004) -Risks of disaster 
2. Risks borne by partners                                - Price (2004) sharing security risk 
3. Risks borne by external controllers            - Turnbull and Wass (1995) government responsible for    
                                                                       severance bill 
4. Risks borne by other stakeholders               - Price (2004) terror risks 
Risk allocation 
Cost of transferring risks                                         -  Turnbull and Wass (1995) 
Costs of risk allocation                                            - Yochum and Agarwal (1987) cost effective access to  
                                                                                       port facilities 
Costs of compliance                                               - Saundry and Turnbull(1999) – coerced compliance 
                                                                                   Saundry and Turnbull (1996)  
Risk sustainability 
Governance 
Growth                                                                     Saundry and Turnbull (1999) –long term sustainability 
 
Table B demonstrates that there is really no major discussion on the key aspects of power 
risk and cost allocation and sustainability. It is clear that most of the issues are considered 
in what we call a narrow corridor of issues emphasising special risks that heighten impact 
for port authorities such as terrorist risks and labour group controls. The broad corridor of 
issues are holistic risk environments such as power domination of ports and risk 
acceptance status of ports, their partners or stakeholders and the management of cost 
allocation. These are hardly considered except in special contexts. The problem of risk 
identification is accentuated when these broad positions are not linked to the specific 
narrow issues. For example, under a partnership arrangement or government intervention, 
the power of port authorities becomes diluted with implications for cost management and 
allocation. So the positive of risk allocation is not considered in line with the negative of 
power dilution, then it becomes difficult to measure the risk  
Narrow corridor issues permeate risks to the broader corridor issues. If considering the 
value of risk allocated, the degree of operational risks arise from power domains and risk 
allocation modes. Risks arising on crane management may be minimal or significant not 
only by reason of human error but on how the operations are controlled by whom.    
It, therefore, becomes critical to ensure that when identifying risks the broad corridor 
issues of power, risk and cost risks are considered in line with the risks arising in the 
narrow corridor.    
Furthermore, it needs to be recognized that external demands on the port authorities 
although the relationship values are more remote can upset risk management capability. 
We argue that when these attributes of power, risk and cost are evaluated in the context 
of potentially negative systemic impacts, there is need for a more substantive model of 
risk identification, allocation and risk sustainability. 
 
2.3 Model of port and partnership risks 
 
We argue that the relationship values of power, risk and cost and the relationship of these 
attributes to the specific attributes of individual port authorities are critical in enabling 
both risk identification and allocation and eventually the modelling for risk sustainability. 
Most studies in the both the practical and empirical arena have not considered how the 
attributes are weighted. For example, power and cost are helpful variables in explaining 
risk but there are no indicators (weighting factors) as to how helpful or injurious they 
might be in certain circumstances. Furthermore, it can be seen that studies have provided 
competing rather than intersectional explanations of power, risk and cost. Xiao-Hua and 
Doloi (2007)
i
 suggest the simultaneous considering of commitment and structure in order 
to develop effective risk allocation strategies.    
 Bing et al (2004) 
ii
 consider in public –private partnerships to know the importance of 
which risk factors are best assigned to the public sector and which to the private sector. 
Their narrow corridor risks subsume power allocations and include nationalization, poor 
political decision-making process, political opposition, site availability and government 
stability. They see the sharing of relationship risks, force majeure and legislation change 
risks by both parties and other risks, predominantly subjective, such as level of public 
support, project approval, contract variation risks, and experience risks be shared on an 
individual case basis as these latter risks were  not easily allocated. These risks specific to 
public private partnerships enable risk identification, however the interaction of power , 
risk and cost considerations enable the identification of specific risk factors affecting 
specific contexts and organizations. The legitimacy of power theory (Foucault, 1971?) , 
resource dependency theory  ( Pieffer, 1981), risk theory and its dependence on human 
subjective judgments, and the theory of the firm (Coase, 1961) explain the importance of 
each of these three attributes  to organizational theory. However, they do not explain that 
power, risk and costs can arise irrespective of dependency and remote relationships based 
on impact rather than on process are equally important. 
Ratcliffe (2004) argued that the use of the PFI increased sustainability, as it required both 
public and private sector partners to consider properly the whole-life cost of a project, 
while Gao and Handley-Schachler (2003), found that the PFI encouraged a clear client-
contractor split, enabling greater clarity in the objectives and scope of the project being 
carried out and avoiding specification creep. 
 
Power relationships are also likely to be a significant factor in the allocation of risks 
which may result in risks being allocated not to the party best placed to manage them but 
to the least powerful party. 
 
Finally, there is the question of affordability.  The partners with the greatest available 
resources may need to indemnify the other partners for the cost of adverse events, 
especially for high impact events which are unpredictable and uncontrollable, in order to 
enable the project to proceed.  Alternatively, external insurance may be sought, where 
such insurance is economically obtainable. 
In conclusion, it is clear that there is no one collective model of risk identification, 
allocation and sustainability arising from the interactions of power, risk and cost for both 
port and partnership risks. However, there are ways of viewing risk in term of risk 
attribute types 
Table C: Frameowrk model of port and partnership risks 
Risk  
Identification 
↓ 
Risk  
Allocation 
↓ 
Risk 
Sustainability 
↓ 
←RISK 
ATTRIBUTES 
↓ 
Cause partnership Governance    ←Power 
Location insurance Risk management  
Nature of Effects Risk sharing Quality management ←Risk 
people affected Risk pricing Customer /stakeholder satisfaction  
degree of symmetry Risk retention Performance management  
Degree of 
predictability 
Negotiation Culture management ←Cost 
Table C considers the key attributes of power, risk and cost in relative context of how 
risks are identified, allocated and sustained. The categorization of risks identified enable 
a profile of risk which link into the key attributes. For example, risks identified by how 
people are affected are to do with behavior of pole and their roles and abilities in 
managing the risk. This in turn involves strategies in risk allocation and ensuring 
effective outcomes of risk management of port and partnership risks. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In the theory of port and partnership risks, most of the work empirically and practically 
considers risk issues in absolute terms rather than considering risks in terms of relative 
attributes.  
 
The scale and nature of port operations necessitates the use of partnership arrangements 
to facilitate the provision of the full range of transport and security services required, 
with many of these services requiring the involvement of public sector partners.  At the 
same time, port operations involve a considerable number of risks of adverse events, 
which vary not only in frequency and impact but also in controllability, predictability, 
symmetry and the parties affected. 
In addition, while the ability of different parties to control risks might be expected to be 
one of the determining factors in risk allocation (HM Treasury 1997, paragraph 3.17), it 
cannot be expected to be the only factor.  Economic dependency may cause the party 
which is unable to control the risk to accept the cost of the risk in order to obtain the 
contract, whether they are the service provider or the recipient.  In addition, some risks, 
such as global economic risks are not really controllable by any of the parties, making 
allocation on the basis of control impossible. Furthermore, where the upside and 
downside risks are symmetrical or where there are major potential gains on the upside, it 
may be advantageous for any party to seek to share the risk of loss in return for sharing 
the potential gains.  The parties may also fail to agree on the profile of risks and, in this 
case, the party which puts the lowest price on the risk may be more likely to accept the 
risk in preference to paying the other party to bear it. 
The risk identification, allocation and sustainability categories were also considered in 
the context of empirical and practical reality. The key attributes that underlie the true risk 
in both port and partnership management that are power, risk and cost management 
realizing on values of negotiating , behavior , processes and managing outcomes 
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